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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
A jury found Mr. Watkins guilty of a single count of lewd conduct with a minor 
under the age of sixteen for allegedly engaging in sex acts with his six year-old 
daughter. Mr. Watkins received a unified sentence of life, with fifteen years fixed. He 
now appeals. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Watkins argued that his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront the witnesses against him was violated when, at trial, the district court allowed 
the State's DNA expert to testify about out-of-court statements made by one of her 
employees, a lab technician, relating to the manner in which that lab technician had 
handled and tested certain critical evidence. Specifically, Mr. Watkins argued that 
because the DNA expert's testimony was not based upon her own personal knowledge, 
but rather (a) her review of the lab technician's notes and (b) her conversations with that 
lab technician, admission of her testimony regarding the manner in which the lab 
technician handled and tested the evidence violated Mr. Watkin's Sixth Amendment 
right to confrontation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.2-10, 14-16.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Watkins' Sixth Amendment 
claim is procedurally barred because it was not preserved with a sufficiently specific 
objection below and because Confrontation Clause violations do not constitute 
fundamental error. (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-7.) The State further argued that even if 
Mr. Watkins' Confrontation Clause claim is properly considered on appeal, it fails 
because the out-of-court statements testified to by its DNA expert are not "testimonial" 
within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and, thus, 
Mr. Watkins had no Constitutional right to confront the declarant of those statements, 
the lab technician. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-28.) 
In his Reply Brief, Mr. Watkins attempted to rebut both of the State's arguments. 
With regard to the procedural barrier which the State sought to erect, Mr. Watkins 
pointed out that Confrontation Clause violations have already been held to be 
fundamental error in Idaho and that the State had offered no valid reason for 
overturning precedent on that issue. (Reply Brief, pp.5-7.) With regard to the State's 
argument on the merits, Mr. Watkins argued that the State's proffered analysis for 
determining whether statements are "testimonial" was untenable, as it was based on a 
mischaracterization of the facts of this case and it was inconsistent with the standards 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court. (Reply Brief, pp.8-9.) 
Mr. Watkins' Reply Brief also raised a new argument which had been overlooked 
in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief. He argued that the DNA expert's testimony 
constituted inadmissible hearsay and ought to have been excluded under I.R.E. 801 
and 802.' (Reply Brief, p.10.) 
Upon receipt of Mr. Watkins' Reply Brief, the Court of Appeals issued an Order 
for Supplemental Briefing. The Court concluded that Mr. Watkins' briefing was 
"insufficient to adequately address either the Confrontation Clause issue raised in the 
Appellant's opening brief or the hearsay issue that the Appellant attempts to raise in his 
reply brief." (Order for Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17, 2007).) Specifically, the 
Court was concerned that, as to the Confrontation Clause argument, Mr. Watkins' 
briefing did not cite or analyze "any of the several decisions from other jurisdictions, 
1 As noted previously, omission of this issue from Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief was the result of an 
oversight on the part of undersigned counsel. 
issued since Davis V. Washington, - U.S. -, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), addressing 
whether the Confrontation Clause bars admission of laboratory test reports, autopsy 
reports and similar evidence analogous to that presented in this case." (Order for 
Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17, 2007).) With regard to the hearsay issue, the Court 
was concerned that "the Appellant's hearsay argument is composed of a single 
paragraph in the reply brief." (Order for Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17, 2007).) 
In accordance with the Court of Appeals' order, Mr. Watkins submitted an 
Appellant's Supplemental Brief. Attached to that brief were two appendices 
summarizing the case law in each jurisdiction that had thus far grappled with the 
question of whether lab reports, autopsy reports, and other such out of court statements 
are considered "testimonial" statements under Crawford and Davis. (Appellant's 
Supplemental Brief, apps. A & B.) In the body of the brief, Mr. Watkins argued, inter 
alia, that a common thread among many of the cases that have addressed this issue is 
that they tend to focus on whether the out-of-court statements in question were made or 
procured in anticipation of litigation (Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp.9-16), and that 
because the out-of-court statements testified to by the State's DNA expert in this case 
were made in anticipation of litigation, they were testimonial and, thus, their admission 
violated Mr. Watkins' right to confrontation (Appellant's Supplemental Brief, p.31). 
Mr. Watkins also argued that the DNA expert's testimony regarding how her lab 
technician allegedly handled and tested certain evidence constituted inadmissible 
hearsay under Idaho Rules of Evidence 801 and 802. (Appellant's Supplemental Brief, 
pp.31-32.) 
The State has now responded with a supplemental brief of its own. In that brief, 
the State presents two arguments on the Confrontation Clause issue: first, it reiterates 
its contention that the out-of-court statements at issue in this case were made "in the 
regular course of business and, thus, are categorically exempt from the Confrontation 
Clause (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.5-6); second, it argues (for the first time) 
that the statements at issue in this case are "neutral" and, therefore, exempt from the 
Confrontation Clause (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.7-13). The State also 
argues against Mr. Watkins' "hearsay" argument on procedural grounds and on the 
basis that the statements at issue in this case were properly admitted under Idaho 
Rules of Evidence 703 and 803(6). (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.15-16.) 
In this Appellant's Supplemental Reply Brief, each of the State's arguments is 
discussed in turn. As is set forth in detail below, each and every one fails. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously articulated in 
Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein. 
ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Watkins' Sixth Amendment right to confrontation violated through the 
district court's admission of Dr. Finis' testimony regarding things she had been 
told by her lab technician andlor his notes? 
2. Was Dr. Finis' testimony regarding things she had been told by her lab technician 
andlor his notes inadmissible hearsay? 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Watkins' Sixth Amendment Right To Confrontation Was Violated When Dr. Finis 
Was Allowed To Testify As To Matters She Had Been Told Bv Her Lab Technician 
AndlOr HerIHis Notes 
A. Introduction 
Throughout the present appeal, Mr. Watkins has argued that the out-of-court 
statements of a lab technician, which were testified to by the State's DNA expert, were 
"testimonial" statements under Crawford and Davis because those statements were 
made by an agent of the State specifically for use in Mr. Watkins' prosecution. In his 
Appellant's Supplement Brief, Mr. Watkins provided a thorough overview of the cases 
dealing with the various states' treatment of lab reports and the like in the post-Crawford 
era, and he argued that the most common thread among those cases is that statements 
made for use in litigation are "testimonial." 
The State disagrees with Mr. Watkins' position. Its latest argument is that the lab 
technician's out-of-court statements are non-testimonial because: (1) they are business 
records; and (2) they do not satisfy a three-part test recently created by the California 
Supreme Court because they do not describe "past" facts and are "neutral." 
Below, Mr. Watkins addresses two of the arguments apparently abandoned by 
the State, pointing out why the State was correct to have abandoned those arguments. 
He then addresses and thoroughly refutes each of the State's two latest arguments. 
Ultimately, he reiterates his contention that, under Crawford, Davis, and the weight of 
the authority generally, out-of-court statements that are created by the State specifically 
for purposes of litigation (such as the lab technician's statements in this case) are 
"testimoniai" under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 
B. The State Appears To Have Correctlv Abandoned Two Of The Meritless 
Arauments Made In Its Resaondent's Brief 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State offered two arguments which it has not 
carried through to its Respondent's Supplemental Brief: (1) Mr. Watkins' waived his 
Confrontation Clause argument by failing to object on Confrontation Clause grounds at 
trial (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-7); and (2) Mr. Watkins' Confrontation Clause argument 
fails because the State's DNA expert testified as to matters within her personal 
knowledge, i.e., her lab's standard operating procedures, not matters reported to her 
through the out-of-court statements of her lab technician (Respondent's Brief, pp.2, 4, 9- 
11). Because neither of these arguments has merit (such that even the State no longer 
stands behind them), this Court should reject them. 
1. The State Ap~ears To Have Abandoned Its Meritless Araument That 
Mr. Watkins' Confrontation Clause Claim Was Waived 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Watkins acknowledged that trial counsel's objections 
to the State's DNA expert's testimony "were focused on the hearsay nature of the 
testimony and the fact that Dr. Finis did not conduct the testing herself," but he argued 
that "even if the objections made were insufficient, in and of themselves, to preserve 
Mr. Watkins' claim that he was denied his right to confront Kermit Channell, the person 
who apparently did the actual testing used against Mr. Watkins, he asserts that he may 
raise this issue because it constitutes fundamental error." (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-13.) 
Mr. Watkins cited State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 91, 856 P.2d 872, 881 (1993) (holding 
that a limitation of a defendant's right to cross examine a witness is fundamental error 
because "it goes to the foundation or basis" of the defendant's rights), in support of his 
argument. (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Watkins' Confrontation 
Clause claim was not a claim of fundamental error because, despite the Supreme 
Court's holding in Araiza, the Court of Appeals had recently stated (in dicta in an as-yet- 
non-final opinion) that a defendant's Confrontation Clause argument would not be 
considered on appeal because it was not objected to at trial. (Respondent's Brief, pp.5- 
7 (citing State V. Hooper, No.31025, 2006 Opinion No. 55, 2006 WL 2328233 (Ct. App. 
Aug. 11, 2006) (hereinafter, Hooper /)).) 
In his Appellant's Reply Brief, Mr. Watkins pointed out the myriad flaws in the 
State's argument,' not the least of which was that Hooper I was not a final decision 
because the ldaho Supreme Court had granted review in that case. (Appellant's Reply 
Brief, pp.5-7.) 
In its Respondent's Supplemental Brief, the State has not discussed, or even 
referenced, its claim that Mr. Watkins' Confrontation Clause claim has been waived. 
(See generally Respondent's Supplemental Brief.) Thus, it appears that the State no 
longer stands behind this argument. 
As it turns out, the State's abandonment of its "waiver" argument is wholly 
appropriate. Since the State filed its Respondent's Supplemental Brief, the Supreme 
Court issued its opinion in State v. Hooper, - Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2007 Opinion No. 
137 (Dec. 24, 2007) (not yet final) (hereinafter, Hooper Hooper I/, which obviously 
supersedes the Court of Appeals' opinion in Hooper I, did not reach the question of 
Rather than repeat all of the arguments he has already made, Mr. Watkin's simply refers the Court to 
pages 5 through 7 of his Appellant's Reply Brief. 
whether a Confrontation Clause argument can be raised for the first time on appeal. 
See generally Hooper /I. Accordingly, the State's argument, which was of questionable 
validity when it was made, is now utterly lacking in support and should be disregarded. 
2. Aruument That Mr. Watkins' Claim Fails Because The DNA Expert 
Testified Onlv To General Procedures Within The Lab 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State also addressed the merits of Mr. Watkins' 
Confrontation Clause claim. In this regard, one argument that the State proffered was 
that the State's DNA expert testified as to matters within her personal knowledge, i.e., 
her lab's standard operating procedures, not matters reported to her through the out-of- 
court statements of her lab technician and, thus, was not even hearsay, much less 
testimonial hearsay within the meaning of Crawford and Davis. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp.2, 4, 9-11.) However, in his Appellant's Reply Brief, Mr. Watkins exposed this 
argument as a gross mischaracterization of the State's DNA expert's objectionable trial 
testimony. (See Appellant's Reply Brief, p.8 & n.2.) 
Apparently, Mr. Watkins' clarification of the record has resonated with the State, 
as the Respondent's Supplemental Brief makes no effort to reiterate, or even 
acknowledge, the State's argument in this regard. (See generally Respondent's 
Supplemental Brief.) To the extent that that argument is still before the Court, however, 
Mr. Watkins contends that it necessarily fails for the reasons previously articulated in his 
Appellant's Reply Brief. (See Appellant's Reply Brief, p.8 & n.2.) 
3 The parties still have 21 days, or until January 14, 2008, to file petitions for rehearing. I.A.R. 42. 
9 
C. Although The State Continues To Arque That Mr. Watkins' Confrontation Clause 
Claim Fails On The Basis That The Statements At Issue Are "Business Records," 
And That Such "Business Records" Are Cateqoricallv Bevond The Reach Of The 
Confrontation Clause. That Argument Still Lacks Merit 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that the out-of-court statements at 
issue in this case fell outside the reach of the Confrontation Clause because those 
statements were contained in the "business records" (as that term is defined in I.R.E. 
803(6)) of the DNA expert's lab. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8, 12, 14-18.) 
In his Appellant's Reply Brief, Mr. Watkins argued that Crawford did not declare, 
categorically, that business records, as defined by each jurisdiction's law, are beyond 
the reach of the Confrontation Clause, and that even if it had, the out-of-court 
statements at issue in this case are not business records under ldaho law because they 
were made or obtained for use in a criminal prosecution. (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp.8- 
9 & n.3.) In his Appellant's Supplemental Brief, Mr. Watkins expanded on that 
argument, asserting that, while a categorical Confrontation Clause exemption for 
business records may be superficially appealing because of its simplicity, it is not 
supported by law or reason. (Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp.17-21.) Specifically, 
Mr. Watkins argued that the Crawford dicta relied upon by the State cannot logically be 
read as the State would have this Court believe and, even if could be read to exempt all 
business records, because the out-of-court statements at issue in this case are not 
business records under either ldaho law or the common law, such an interpretation of 
Crawford does not further the State's argument in any way. (Appellant's Supplemental 
Brief, pp.19-21.) 
Nevertheless, the State continues to argue that Crawford specifically exempted 
"business records" from the Confrontation Clause, and that because the out-of-court 
statements at issue in this case were made in the regular course of business of the 
State's expert's DNA lab, they do not "trigger[ ] Crawford protection." (Respondent's 
Supplemental Brief, pp.5-6.) 
Mr. Watkins submits that the State's is still incorrect for the reasons previously 
articulated in his Appellant's Supplemental Brief. (See Appellant's Supplemental Brief, 
D. Althouah The State Has Expanded Upon Its Argument That Out-Of-Court 
Statements Reflectina "Neutral" Observations Are Non-Testimonial, That 
Argument Still Lacks Merit Because It Is Based Upon A Misinterpretation Of The 
Relevant Case Law, As Well As Faultv Reasoning 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State seems to have argued that the out-of-court 
statements at issue in this case, i,e., the lab technician's written notes and oral 
statements about how he handled and tested certain pieces of evidence, are non- 
testimonial because those statements were not specifically directed at Mr. Watkins and 
because they were not subject to interpretation or explanation. (See Respondent's 
Brief, pp.8-9, 11, 13, 16-18.) In its Respondent's Supplemental Brief, the State vastly 
expands upon this argument. 
The State now argues that that there is a three-part test for determining whether 
lab reports and other such statements are testimonial within the meaning of Crawford 
and 0avis: and that each part of that test must be satisfied before such statements can 
be considered testimonial. (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.4, 7, 12-13.) The 
State also argues that the key to determining whether such statements are testimonial 
The State summarizes that test as follows: ( I )  whether the statement was made to law enforcement, or 
by or to a law enforcement agent; (2) whether the statement describes a past fact related to criminal 
activity; and (3) whether the statement was made for possible use at a later trial. (Respondent's 
Supplemental Brief, pp.4, 7, 12-13.) 
is to inquire into whether those statements consist of "neutral scientific data or rather 
conclusory scientific data analysis." (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, p.7.) The State 
then goes on to argue that the lab technician's statements in this case were "merely a 
contemporaneous recording of an observable scientific test that in and of itself does not 
link the defendant to a past criminal act," and, thus, are non-testimonial. (Respondent's 
Supplemental Brief, p.13.) All of these arguments, however, are unconvincing. 
1. Althouah The State Would Have This Court Believe Otherwise. It's Entire 
Araument Was Lifted From A Single Case From The California Supreme 
court 
The State argues that Mr. Watkins's analysis of some 130 cases from 45 
jurisdictions "obfuscates important distinctions" in recent Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence, and that a more appropriate analysis would involve an inquiry into "cases 
just involving DNA lab reports, the kind of report at issue here."= (Respondent's 
Supplemental Brief, p.3) The State then goes on to imply that there are a wealth of 
such cases, and that its analysis of those cases reveals clear guidance on how DNA lab 
reports and the like ought to be treated in the aftermath of Crawford and Davis. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.3-4 ("[A] review limited to cases involving just DNA lab reports, 
the kind of report at issue here, shows . . . . This limited review shows . . . ."), p.4 
(accusing Mr. Watkins of misleading the Court by stating that the relevant case law is 
It is interesting that the State takes issue with Mr. Watkins having provided this Court with a 
comprehensive look at the relevant case law (instead of myopically focusing on a small number of post- 
Davis DNA cases, as the State now does), since many of the cases discussed by Mr. Watkins are the 
very same cases relied upon by the State in its Respondent's Brief (see Respondent's Brief, pp.16-17 
(citing six cases, five of which pre-dated Davis and dealt with evidence other than DNA reports)) and by 
the California Supreme Court in the one case on which the State now relies, see People v. Geier, 161 
P.3d 104, 134-140 (Cal. 2007) (discussing approximately seventeen cases, most of which pre-dated 
Davis and dealt with evidence other than DNA reports, analyzed by Mr. Watkins in his Appellant's 
Supplemental Brief). 
"all over the map"),6 pp.4-5 ("Cases dealing with DNA lab reports are no different. A 
review of these cases shows . . . ."), p.7 ("When applying these factors to DNA lab 
reports, courts have . . . . Stated differently, courts look at. . . ." ), p.10 ("The distinction 
is consistent with every DNA case where raw DNA data alone provided the basis for a 
testifying expert's ultimate conclusion.").) However, even a cursory review of the 
Respondent's Supplemental Brief reveals that the State's latest argument is nothing 
more than a wholesale adoption of the analysis employed in a single case from the 
California Supreme ~ o u r t . ~  (Compare Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.3-5, 7-13, 
with People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 133-140 (Cal. 2007). For example, a review of the 
Geier decision reveals that the State's proffered three-part test for determining whether 
an out-of-court statement is testimonial, which the State implies is in widespread use, 
was first created by the California Supreme Court only a few short months ago. See 
Geier, 161 P.3d at 138-39. Moreover, the State has not cited to any other decision 
which has explicitly adopted and applied that three-part test. 
6 While this Court can obviously examine the authorities and determine for itself whether Mr. Watkins has 
attempted to mislead it, it should be noted that even People v. Geier, 162 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007), the sole 
authority from which the State's entire argument is now derived, makes it clear that the cases attempting 
to apply Crawford and Davis to lab reports and other such out-of-court statements are, in fact, "all over 
the map." The Geier Court noted that "[clourts that have addressed this issue disagree as to the answer," 
that "courts on both sides of the question have . . . found support in Davis for their position," and, that "we 
have found no single analysis of the applicability of Crawford and Davis to the kind of scientific evidence 
at issue in this case to be entirely persuasive. . . ." Id. at 134, 138. 
7 The opinion now adopted by the State, People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007), was issued on July 2, 
2007, two weeks before Mr. Watkins filed his Appellant's Supplemental Brief. However, that opinion was 
not discussed in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Supplemental Brief because it was not located by undersigned 
counseCpresumably because undersigned counsel's research had been completed by the time the 
opinion was published. 
2. Geier. The Case From Which The State's Entire Argument Is Derived, 
Was Poorlv Reasoned And Wronalv Decided 
As noted, the State's entire argument, including its proffered three-part test, is 
derived entirely from the California Supreme Court's opinion in People v. ~eier. ' In 
Geier, a case in which the government's DNA expert testified, over a defense objection, 
as to how a lab technician had handled and tested certain evidence before offering her 
opinion about a DNA match, the California Supreme Court surveyed some of the 
relevant case law and concluded as follows: 
Whiie we have found no single analysis of the applicability of 
Crawford and Davis to the kind of scientific evidence at issue in this case 
to be entirely persuasive, we are nonetheless more persuaded by those 
cases concluding that such evidence is not testimonial, based on our own 
interpretation of Crawford and Davis. For our purposes in this case, 
involving the admission of a DNA report, what we extract from those 
8 The State cites thirteen cases which it claims are consistent with Geier: Roberts v. United States, 916 
A.2d 922 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007), State v. Lewis, 235 S.W.3d 136 (Tenn. 2007), State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 
390 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2005), Veney v. United States, 929 A.2d 448 (D.C. Ct. App. 2007) 
(hereinafter, Veney I), Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1 (D.C. Ct. App. 2006), Martin v. State, 936 
So.2d 1190 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006), People v. Lonsby, 707 N.W.2d 610 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), State v. 
March, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo. 2007), United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123 (C.A.A.F. 2006), State v. 
Hawkins, 2007 WL 61874 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2007), State v. Marshal, 2007 WL 1793875 (Haw. Ct. 
App. Jun. 22, 2007), People v. Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92 (111. Ct. App. 2006), State v. Miller, 144 P.3d 1052 (Or. 
Ct. App. 2006). However, a review of those cases (eleven of which were discussed in Mr. Watkins' 
Appellant's Supplemental Brief) reveals that each and every one supports Mr. Watkins' contention that 
statements made at the behest of law enforcement for use in a criminal prosecution are "testimonial" 
under Crawford and Davis. 
In Lewis, one of the two cases not mentioned in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Supplemental Brief 
(because it was not published until almost a month after Mr. Watkins filed that brief), the Tennessee 
Supreme Court held that the government's DNA expert was correctly allowed to offer her expert opinions, 
even though she was the one who performed the actual laboratory analysis, but it strongly implied that it 
would have been improper for her to have testified as to the data gathering done by another. Lewis, 235 
S.W.3d at 151. 
In Veney I, the other case not mentioned in Mr. Watkins' Appellant's Supplemental Brief (again, 
because it was not published until after Mr. Watkins' brief was filed), the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals stated more explicitly that which the Tennessee Supreme Court had alluded to: "the descriptions 
of the methodology used" by non-testifying lab technicians, as testified to by another, is "testimonial" 
hearsay which is required to be subjected to cross-examination under Crawford. Veney 1, 929 A.2d at 
469. Notably, however, the portion of Veney I relied upon by the State and discussed herein is no longer 
good law. On November 16, 2007, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals issued an order withdrawing 
the relevant portion of Veney I on the basis that that portion of the opinion was unnecessary in light of the 
court's ultimate resolution of the case. Veney v. United States, A.2d -, 2007 WL 4116020 (D.C. Ct. 
App. Nov. 16, 2007) (not yet final). That same day, the court issued amended opinion. See Veney v. 
United States, - A.2d -, 2007 WL 4325220 (D.C. Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2007) (not yet final). 
decisions is that a statement is testimonial if (1) it is made to a law 
enforcement officer or by or to a law enforcement agent and (2) describes 
a past fact related to criminal activity for (3) possible use at a later trial. 
Conversely, a statement that does not meet all three criteria is not 
testimonial. 
Geier, 161 ~ : 3 d  at 134-39. The Court then went on to discuss, at length, the second 
part of its three-part test. It explained that, based on its interpretation of Davis, if a 
statement is made contemporaneously with the occurrence of the thing discussed in 
that statement, the statement cannot be said to describe a past fact and, therefore, the 
statement is necessarily non-testimonial. Id. at 139, 140. It then went on to claim that 
such a view is consistent with those cases which have held that out-of-court statements 
in lab reports (and the like) which simply record objective facts (as opposed to 
subjective opinions) are non-testimonial because they are non-accusatory. Id. at 139- 
40. 
The flaws in the California Supreme Court's reasoning are significant. First, as 
the ldaho Supreme Court has recently noted, the United States Supreme Court has 
thus far only identified various formulations of "core" testimonial statements, "not an 
exclusive list of 'testimonial' evidence." State v. Hooper, - Idaho -, - P.3d -, 2007 
Opinion No. 137, pp.5-6 (Dec. 24, 2007) (not yet final). Accord Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 
2273-74 (declining to produce an exhaustive list of testimonial and non-testimonial 
statements); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 68 (identifying three formulations of "core" 
testimonial statements, specifically endorsing none of them, and "leav[ing] for another 
day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial"'). Thus, the 
Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea of creating bright-line standard for 
delineating the outer boundaries of what might be considered "testimonial" evidence 
which, of course, is exactly what the California Supreme Court's three-part test attempts 
to do. 
Second, to the extent that the California Supreme Court's three-part test finds to 
be dispositive the timing of the statement in question (part two of the test), it represents 
a colossal misreading of Davis. In Davis and its companion case of Hammon v. 
Indiana, the Supreme Court held that a 9-1-1 caller who gave information to the police 
in an effort to seek help in an ongoing emergency had given a "non-testimonial" 
statement, whereas a crime victim who gave an after-the-fact statement to the police 
had given a "testimonial" statement. While the Supreme Court certainly factored the 
timing of each statement (vis-a-vis the thing described therein) into the analysis of 
whether each statement was testimonial or non-testimonial, the timing of each 
statement was not dispositive for the Court. With regard to the 9-1-1 call, the Court 
considered four factors: (1) the timing of the statement in relation to the timing of the 
events described in that statement; (2) the declarant's purpose for giving the statement; 
(3) the law enforcement agent's purpose in questioning the declarant; and (4) the 
formality of the statement. Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77. Ultimately, the Court held that 
statement was non-testimonial because it: 
conclude[d] from all this that the circumstances of [the] interrogation 
objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency. [The declarant] simply was not acting as a 
witness; she was not testifying. What she said was not 'a weaker 
substitute for live testimony' at trial. 
Id. at 2277 (emphasis in original). With regard to the after-the-fact statement, however, 
the Court, applying the same four-factored analysis, held that because "the interrogation 
was part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct," the declarant clearly 
was not seeking help for any immediate danger, "the primary, if not indeed the sole, 
purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime," and the statement was 
somewhat formal in that it was a deliberate effort to respond to police questioning, the 
statement in question was "an obvious substitute for live testimony" and, therefore, was 
"inherently testimonial." Id. at 2278. 
Third, to the extent that the Geier Court has attempted to marry the standards of 
its own three-part test to the reasoning of prior decisions in which various courts have 
held that lab reports and the like are non-testimonial because they are "objective" or 
"neutral," or because they merely recite scientific "facts," see Geier, 161 P.3d at 140, 
that attempt is wholly unpersuasive. As is discussed at some length in Mr. Watkins' 
Appellant's Supplemental Brief, those cases that have labeled out-of-court statements 
"non-testimonial" based on the belief that those statements were "objective," "neutral," 
or "factual" have clearly been premised upon the belief that the statements in question 
were reliable. (See Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp. 21-26.) Reliability, however, is 
not one of the three factors in the California Supreme Court's test. See Geier, 161 P.3d 
at 138-29. 
Fourth, to the extent that the Geier Court has attempted to distinguish between 
accusatory statements and statements made by lab technicians (which it labels "non- 
accusatory" because they are made as part of the lab technicians' jobs and because 
scientific evidence has the power to exonerate as well as convict), id. at 140, the 
California Supreme Court again deviates from its own three-part test. See Geier, 161 
P.3d at 138-29. More importantly though, it also deviates from all logic. Making the 
question of whether a statement is testimonial turn on whether it is made pursuant to an 
obligation imposed by a witness' job is completely arbitrary, finds no support in either 
Crawford or Davis, and would lead to the absurd situation where statements made by 
police officers would automatically become non-testimonial. The same criticisms hold 
for making the question of whether a statement is testimonial turn on whether it 
potentially has the power to exonerate or convict. If that were the standard, there would 
be no such thing as a testimonial statement. Indeed, even the statement of an 
eyewitness to a murder has the power to exonerate-if the witness said that the 
defendant was not the killer. 
3. Even If Geier Were Sound And Worthv Of Adoption In Idaho. The 
Admission Of The Out-Of-Court Statements At Issue In This Case Still 
Violated Mr. Watkins' Right To Confrontation Because Those Statements 
Involved The Lab Technician's Opinion And Analvsis 
Key to the State's present argument is the assumption the lab technician who 
tested the evidence in question provided only "neutral" statements, devoid of any 
subjective analysis, interpretation, or opinion. (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.4, 
7-13.) However, that assumption is not correct. In fact, the lab technician did undertake 
some level of analysis, presumably calling for his subjective opinion based on his 
scientific training and experience, when he tested certain pieces of evidence for the 
presence of semen. The State's DNA expert made this clear when she testified as to 
how certain swabs were handled by her technician: 
Q. So after he unsealed this package, what did Mr. Channell do 
with it? 
A. He examined the swabs that were collected from Ms. Watkins 
for the presence of semen. 
Q. . . . Had you spoke [sic] with Mr. Channell regarding what he 
would do with his items prior to his testing? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. What did you discuss? 
A. We discussed that he would exam them for semen. And if 
there was no semen on the oral swabs, they would be used as a reference 
sample since there was no blood sample from the little girl. 
Q. And are you aware of whether or not Mr. Channell found any 
semen on the swabs? 
A. I am. He did not. 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p.188, L.23 - p.189, L.22 (emphasis added); see also Tr. Vol. II, p.193, 
Ls.10-11 (testifying that a different piece of evidence was tested for the presence of 
semen, and that semen was found on that item), p.297, Ls.18-21 (same), p.218, Ls.23- 
25 (testifying that she "believed" a chemical test for semen had been conducted).) 
Later, with regard to a different piece of evidence, she again testified that the lab 
technician examined that evidence and tested it for the presence of semen, and this 
time she testified that the technician determined that semen was present: 
Q. . . . He looked for the presence of semen, and on one pair of 
those seven he locafed semen. 
Q. Did you indicate semen was found on this pair of underwear? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And where was it located at? 
A. There were actually two different areas in which semen was 
identified. 2S, which was the stronger amount of semen indication, was 
closer to the rear crotch area, and 1 S was an area that is more up the left 
buttock in the rear. 
Q. In the rear area. But both of them were in the rear area? 
A. That's correct. 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p.203, L.18 - p.205, L.3 (emphasis added); see also Tr. Vol. II, p.205, L.24 
- p.206, L.5 (testifying that, overall, semen was found on two pieces of evidence).) 
Given the foregoing, it simply cannot be said the lab technician in this case 
merely performed ministerial duties and made "neutral" observations about objective 
facts. He clearly has a certain level of expertise and, although he may not have 
rendered any opinion as to any DNA matches, he obviously used his specialized skills 
to engage in a subjective analysis of the evidence. And because the results of his 
subjective analysis were conveyed to the jury through the testimony of the State's DNA 
expert, even under the State's proffered standard for determining whether lab reports 
and the like are testimonial, it is clear that the lab technician's out-of-court statements in 
this case are, in fact, testimonial and, therefore, should have been subjected to 
confrontation. 
E. Conclusion: Crawford And Davis Make It Clear That The Out-Of-Court 
Statements Of The Lab Technician In This Case Are Testimonial 
Although the State paints a picture of consensus among the states, the reality is 
that all the State has done is found one more poorly-reasoned case which has reached 
an outcome which the State views as favorable. As noted above, however, that case 
(just like the many others that have found lab reports and the like to be non-testimonial 
(see Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp.16-31 (pointing out the legal and logical failings 
of those cases))), simply cannot withstand rigorous scrutiny. 
Mr. Watkins urges this Court to look to Crawford and Davis and, in particular, the 
four-factored analysis of Davis (considering not only the timing of the statement, but 
also the declarant's purpose in making that statement and the government's purpose in 
eliciting that statement), to determine whether an out-of-court statement is "testimonial," 
i.e., whether it is a weaker substitute for live testimony. He submits that if it does so, it 
will have to agree with the large number of jurisdiction that have held that out-of-court 
statements made by a government agent, explicitly for use in a criminal prosecution, are 
testimonial statements. (See Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp.9-16 (compiling 
dozens of cases from myriad jurisdictions which have given significant weight to the 
purpose for which the statement was made or procured).) And because the lab 
technician's out-of-court statements in this case, as testified to by the State's DNA 
expert, were made expressly for the purpose of obtaining Mr. Watkins' conviction, 
Mr. Watkins submit that those statements must be held to be testimonial and, therefore, 
subject to cross-examination under the Sixth Amendment. 
Dr. Finis' Testimonv Regarding Matters She Had Learned From Her Assistant, AndlOr 
Her Assistant's Notes. Was Inadmissible Hearsay 
In his Appellant's Reply Brief, Mr. Watkins presented a new appellate issue 
which had been overlooked in his opening brief. He argued that the lab technician's 
out-of-court statements, as testified to by the State's DNA expert, should not have been 
admitted because they constituted inadmissible hearsay. (Appellant's Reply Brief, 
p.10.) In its order for supplemental briefing, however, the Court of Appeals noted that 
this brief argument, raised for the first time in reply, was "insufficient to adequately 
address" the hearsay argument. (Order for Supplemental Briefing, p.1 (Apr. 17,2007).) 
In accordance with the Court of Appeals' order, Mr. Watkins re-raised, with more 
specificity, his hearsay argument. (See Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp.31-32.) 
Specifically, he argued that the out-of-court statements of the lab technician, as testified 
to by the State's DNA expert were hearsay under I.R.E. 801, and that they were 
inadmissible under I.R.E. 802 because they were "business records" under I.R.E. 
803(6) and because they were not properly admitted for their truth under I.R.E. 703. 
(Appellant's Supplemental Brief, pp.31-32.) 
In its Respondent's Supplemental Brief, the State argues that Mr. Watkins' 
hearsay argument is barred on procedural grounds, and because the statements at 
issue are, in fact, inadmissible. (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, pp.14-16.) As set 
forth in detail below, none of the State's present arguments have merit. 
A. Mr. Watkins' Hearsav Arqument Is Not Procedurallv Barred 
The State offers two bases by which it hopes to keep this Court from reaching 
the merits of Mr. Watkins' hearsay argument. First, it argues that Mr. Watkins' claim 
was waived because it was not raised in his original Appellant's Brief; second, it 
contends that Mr. Watkins has "not identified any out-of-court statement being offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted"; and third, it asserts that Mr. Watkins never objected 
to the hearsay in question (Respondent's Brief, pp.14-15.) None of these arguments 
are persuasive. 
Even if Mr. Watkins' attempt to raise the hearsay issue in his Appellant's Reply 
Brief would have been inadequate to present that issue for appeal in the absence of 
supplemental briefing, the reality is that the Court of Appeals specifically granted 
Mr. Watkins an opportunity to submit supplemental briefing wherein he could properly 
raise that issue. Mr. Watkins did so, and now the State has had a full and fair 
opportunity to respond to his arguments; thus, the issue should be considered on its 
merits. Cf. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993) 
(explaining that the reason that the appellant cannot raise new issues in his reply brief is 
that his doing so prevents "full consideration of the issue"). 
With regard to the State's claim that Mr. Watkins has failed to identify the 
hearsay statements complained of, nothing could be further from the truth. In his very 
first brief, Mr. Watkins block-quoted almost eight full pages of the testimony of the 
State's DNA expert's testimony and made it clear that he took issue with every instance 
in the quoted text in which the testifying expert recited the things she had learned from 
her conversations with her lab technician and/or a review of her lab technician's notes. 
(See Appellant's Brief, pp.2-10.) He further specified that his complaint was with the 
expert's testimony as to what her lab technician had told her regarding his "receipt, 
observation, and testing of the various biological samples at issue." (Appellant's Brief, 
p.13.) Thus, even without Mr. Watkins re-quoting copious amounts of objectionable 
testimony, it should be quite obvious which testimony his appellate claims relate to. 
With regard to the State's claim that Mr. Watkins has failed to object to the 
hearsay testimony at issue, again, nothing could be further from the truth. Interspersed 
with approximately eight pages of block-quoted testimony at issue are no less than 
three defense objections to the State's DNA expert testifying about things told to her by 
her lab technician: the first was specifically on "hearsay" grounds (Tr. Vol. 11, p.186, 
Ls.14-16); the second was less explicit, but was along the same lines (Tr. Vol. Ill, p.200, 
Ls.16-21); and the third was interposed as a "renewed" objection on the grounds 
previously stated, and was accompanied by a motion to strike all of the DNA evidence 
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p.205, Ls.15-17). Thus, it is clear that there were, in fact, timely, 
appropriate objections from defense counsel at trial. 
B. The Lab Technician's Out-Of-Court Statements, As Testified To Bv The State's 
DNA Exaert. Are Inadmissible Hearsay 
Turning to the merits of Mr. Watkins' hearsay argument, the State seems to 
concede that the lab technician's out-of-court statements, as testified to by its DNA 
expert, were offered for the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore would fit the 
definition of "hearsay" under I.R.E. 801, but it argues that those statements were 
nevertheless properly admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 803(6) (hearsay exception for 
business records) and I.R.E. 703 (basis of opinion testimony by experts). The State, 
however, is wrong on both counts. 
Rule 803(6) provides that certain records, i.e., business records, are excluded 
from the general prohibition against admitting hearsay evidence. I.R.E. 803(6); see also 
I.R.E. 802 (providing that hearsay is inadmissible "except as provided by these rules or 
other rules"). However, the out-of-court statements made by the lab technician and 
testified to by the State's DNA expert in this case are not business records. Some of 
those statements appear to have been made orally (see Tr. Vol. Ill, p.183, L.21 - p.184, 
L.l, p.189, Ls.7-15) and, thus, would not be records at all. The remaining statements, 
as reflected in the lab technician's note, would not be business records either, as those 
statements were clearly made for use in a criminal prosecution. State v. Sandoval- 
Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 91 1-12, 71 P.3d 1055, 1058-59 (2003). Thus, Rule 803(6) cannot 
be used to justify the admission of the lab technician's statements for their truth. 
Rule 703 provides that expert opinion testimony may be based upon inadmissible 
facts or data if those facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
field. I.R.E. 703. However, nothing in the text of Rule 703 allows for the proponent of 
the expert opinion to use that expert opinion to bootstrap otherwise inadmissible 
evidence into the jury box, which, of course, is precisely what the State urges in this 
case (Respondent's Supplemental Brief, p.16). Although the State's argument might 
have been well-taken a few years ago when a different version of Rule 703 was 
sometimes read to allow such a tactic, see, e.g., Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 ldaho 
454, 463-64, 886 P.2d 330, 339-40 (1994) (holding that an expert may testify to facts 
stated in reports prepared by other, non-testifying experts); State v. Grube, 126 ldaho 
377, 386-87, 883 P.2d 1069, 1078-79 (1994) (holding that an expert can testify as to 
hearsay evidence which forms the basis of his expert opinion, but where the hearsay 
does not form the basis of a qualified expert opinion, the expert cannot testify to it); cf, 
e.g., Doty v. Bishara, 123 ldaho 329, 335-36, 848 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1992) (stating in 
dicta that, under Rule 703, an expert may testify as to things stated in someone else's 
notes); Long v. tfendricks, 109 ldaho 73, 76-77, 705P.2d 78, 81-82 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(holding, under pre-Rules of Evidence authorities, that a testifying expert could relate 
information learned from others, and stating that such a holding is consistent with the 
newly-enacted I.R.E. 703), such interpretations of the Rule have been criticizedg and, as 
9 For example, Professor D. Craig Lewis has noted as follows: 
Decisions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have taken the 
position that IRE 703 permits disclosure, during direct examination of an expert witness, 
of the otherwise inadmissible facts or data on which the opinion is based. . . . In the 
author's opinion, these decisions have misapplied IRE 703. Nothing in IRE 703 or 705 
indicates an intention to create an independent basis for the admission of otherwise 
incompetent evidence . . . ; instead, the apparent purpose of IRE 703 is to broaden the 
acceptable bases on which expert opinions may be rendered to coincide with the actual 
practice of experts. In addition, an interpretation of the rule which permits an expert to 
serve as a conduit for the introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence puts the 
opponent in the unfair position of either leaving that evidence unchallenged or further 
emphasizing it on cross-examination. 
a result, the Rule has since been amended. The 2002 amendment of Rule 703 added 
language stating that "[flacts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be 
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court 
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's 
opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." I.R.E. 703. This language was 
added for the express purpose of clarifying that, although an expert opinion can rely on 
inadmissible evidence, such reliance does not make the otherwise inadmissible 
evidence admissible. EVIDENCE RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE MINUTES OF MEETING OF 
NOVEMBER 2, 2001, pp.1, 3 (attached as Exhibit A). Thus, in both Sfate v. Doe, 140 
ldaho 873, 878-79,103 P.3d 967, 972-73 (Ct. App. 2004), and State v. Scovell, 136 
Idaho 587, 592-93, 38 P.3d 625, 630-31 (Ct. App. 2001),'~ the Court of Appeals has 
made it clear that expert opinion testimony cannot be used to bootstrap otherwise 
inadmissible evidence into the jury box. Thus, Rule 703 cannot be used to justify the 
admission of the lab technician's statements for their truth in this case. 
The bottom line is that the lab technician's out-of-court statements were admitted 
for their truth, but they should not have been because they are inadmissible hearsay. 
Properly applied, the rule will allow the expert to state an opinion based on 
inadmissible evidence and to indicate the general nature of the sources on which the 
expert has relied, but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the contents of the sources on 
direct examination unless they are otherwise admissible. Although this may in some 
circumstances tend to weaken the apparent validity of the opinion it will also serve to 
encourage parties to base their experts' opinions, to the extent feasible, on otherwise 
admissible data. In an unusual case where the opinion cannot satisfactorily be presented 
without some reference to the inadmissible data, the court has discretionary authority to 
control the scope of the disclosure and to give limiting instructions to avoid the misuse of 
the evidence. 
Federal courts applying the identical Federal Rule of Evidence 703 have 
recognized that the rule is intended to authorize admission of the opinion but not the 
inadmissible underlying data. 
D. CRAIG LEWIS, IDAHOTRIAL HANDBOOK 5 16.9 (1995). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as those set forth in Mr. Watkins' previous 
briefs, Mr. Watkins respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
sentence and remand his case for a new trial. 
DATED this 2" day of January, 2008. 
& 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
10 Interestingly, the Scovell decision was issued the day before the Evidence Rules Advisory Committee 
met and voted to amend Rule 703. 
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EXHIBIT A 
Evidence Rules Advisory Committee 
 minutes of Meeting of November 2,2001 
Present: Judge Karen Lansing, Chair; Judge Randy Smith, Judge John Sellman, Steve 
Smith, Kipp Manwaring, Craig Lewis, Marie Tyler, Doug Werth, Tony Anegon, John 
Lynne, James Archibald and Cathy Derden. 
As part of the agenda, the Committee was to review recent changes to the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and discuss whether Idaho should make similar changes. The Idaho Trial 
Lawyer's Association sent several representatives to express their opposition to any 
proposed change to I.R.E. 702 on expert testimony. The representatives were Walt 
Bithell, Curt Holzer, Jim Harris, Dave Manweiler, Bob Talboy and Andy Chason, 
president-elect of the ITLA. Merlyn Clark also attended. 
Walt Bithell was the spokesman for the group and he asked the Committee to exercise 
caution before recommending any change to the Idaho rule to mirror the federal rule. 
The federal rule was recently amended in response to Daubert v. Menill Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, and provides some general standards that the trial court must use to 
assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony. Bithell noted that 
there is a split in the federal circuit courts over how Daubert is to be applied, with a case 
in the 11" Circuit, Rvler v. Sandos Pharmaceutical, raising a number of questions in 
terms of whether the court is a fact finder as part of its gate keeping role in admitting 
reliable expert testimony. If the court is a fact finder, then it raises the bar in terms of 
what can be admitted into evidence. Bithell stated that another potential problem with 
adopting the federal rule is an increase in pre-trial motions and Rule 104 hearings on the 
admissibility of evidence since there is uncertainty about what it takes to meet the 
Daubert standard. Idaho has a workable rule now. If Idaho adopts the federal language 
then everyone will look to the federal court opinions for interpretation and the split and 
controversy that exists in the federal courts over the meaning of the language will create 
the same problems in Idaho. 
To a certain extent the Idaho Supreme Court has moved in the direction of Daubert and 
some on the Committee did not think the amendment would really change anything since 
the addition to the rule sets out three things that are already being considered under the 
admissibility test Idaho courts now use. The counter argument is if Idaho courts already 
take these things into consideration under our existing test then why add the language and 
give the perception that the rule and the test are being changed. When you change 
language in a rule it tends to create litigation over its meaning and application. 
The ITLA had no position on whether I.R.E. 703 should be changed to read the same as 
the new F.R.E. 703; however, Merlyn Clark stated that he believed the Idaho courts have 
been misconstruing this rule and that the Idaho rule should read the same as the federal 
rule, although this would change existing law in Idaho. 
The members of ITLA then left and Merlyn Clark stayed. 
There was some discussion about the role of the Committee and Judge Smith was 
concerned with whether it should advocate substantive changes in the law or just make 
sure that the rules reflect current law. Craig Lewis believed the Committee should keep 
the court aware of new issues and any problems in application of the rules that need 
clarification. Judge Lansing pointed out that the Committee was an advisory one. All 
agreed that it would be helpful to have more input from the members of the bar as to 
proposed changes. 
Rule 702. Testimony By Exuerts. The federal rule recently added language on assessing 
reliability of expert testimony by stating it was admissible if 1) the testimony is 
sufficiently based upon reliable facts or data, 2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and 3) the witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case. 
After hearing the comments of the ITLA there was a consensus that although the 
language in the federal rule sets out what the courts should be doing and what many 
Idaho courts are doing under the present rules, the concern over picking up problems in 
application that are being litigated in federal court was real. If the current rule is working 
and if the Idaho courts are already looking at these three things then there is no reason to 
change the rule. Many were also concerned about the extra time and expense of more 
pretrial hearings, but Judge Smith stated that now there are too many motions to exclude 
experts that are not made until the case is in the middle of trial and the parties are pressed 
for time. In federal court when you disclose an expert you have to set out ahead of time 
the expert's qualifications, methods used, analysis and foundation so the other side has a 
basis on which to object and can do it before trial. In Idaho, you do not have to disclose 
this information ahead of time and there is often not enough information to make a 
challenge until you get to trial. This is why Idaho does not have more pre-trial hearings. 
Although the Committee voted not to recommend any changes to I.R.E. 702, the 
Committee recommended that the Discovery Committee look at I.R.C.P. 28 and 26(b)(4) 
with the idea of requiring that more information be disclosed ahead of time as to expert 
testimony. 
Rule 701. Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses. The federal counterpart of this rule 
was recently amended with a new subsection (c) that states the testimony is "not based on 
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." The 
amendment was to eliminate the risk that the reliability requirements of 702 will be 
evaded through the simple expedient of proffering an expert as a lay witness. The idea of 
this amendment is not to distinguish between lay and expert witnesses but between lay 
and expert testimony and to make it clear that if the testimony crosses the line then you 
have to go to Rule 702 and lay a foundation for the expert testimony. 
There was some concern about the reference to "specialized knowledge" and the effect 
this might have on allowing lay opinion testimony. There was discussion about whether 
this would impact allowing owners of property to testify as to value, but the federal 
advisory notes state specifically that the amendment is not intended to have an impact on 
current law allowing this testimony and Idaho has specific case law allowing this 
testimony. There was also discussion as to how this might apply to the testimony of a 
treating doctor or to the testimony of an officer who applies a gaze nystagrnus test and is 
trained to apply it but does not understand the underlying methodology, but the consensus 
was that this rule change should not affect that testimony. 
The Committee voted seven in favor and two against recommending that Idaho adopt the 
language. 
The amendment to 701 would read: 
Rule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witness. If the witness is not testifying as an expert, 
the testimony of the witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those 
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and 
(b) helpfkl to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination 
of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific. technical or other specialized 
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 
Rule 703. Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts. The federal rule was amended to 
emphasize that when an expert reasonably relies on inadmissible information to form an 
opinion or inference, the underlying information is not admissible simply because the 
opinion or inference is admitted. Some Idaho courts have allowed inadmissible evidence 
to come in through an expert who testifies on direct about what he or she relied on in 
forming the opinion and this has been a back door for getting this evidence in the record. 
The intent of the rule is just that the opinion does not have to be excluded because part of 
the basis was evidence that would not be admissible by itself. 
The Committee voted to recommend the addition of the following language with eight 
members voting for the amendment and one abstention. 
Rule 703 would be amended by adding a sentence as follows: 
. . . the facts or data need not be admissible in wideme order for the opinion or reference 
to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not he disclosed to the 
jury bv the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the iurv to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweids their prejudicial effect. 
Rule 407. Subseauent remedial measures. The Idaho rule currently refers to ''after an 
event" and there has been some ambiwitv as to whether the event is the act of injury or - - 
whether it could refer to the manufacture of a product. The federal rule was amended to 
clarify that the event is the injury and to clarify that this rule is meant to apply to products 
liability cases. This clarification would be consistent with application and interpretation 
of the rule in Idaho. 
The Committee voted unanimously to recommend the following amendment: 
Rule 407. Subsequent remedial measures. dk-m-w& When. after an 
iniurv or harm allegedlv caused bv an event, measures are taken which, if taken 
previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, et: culpable conduct, a defect in the 
product, a defect in the product's design. or a need for a warning or instruction kt 
-. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of 
subsequent measures if offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, 
or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence. The Committee reviewed the amendment to the 
federal rule on offer of proof, which states: "Once the court makes a definitive ruling on 
the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not 
renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal." 
The problem is that you often don't get a definitive ruling before trial because the court 
wants to wait and see relevance in the context of the trial. Judge Smith and Judge 
Lansing worried about letting counsel believe they were safe by not renewing an 
objection, and both stated that they would rather see the added objection. The Committee 
decided the price of not amending the rule was the attorney may object when it is not 
necessary to do so a second time, which is no problem, while the price of the amendment 
may be that counsel won't object when there is a need to do so, which does create a 
problem. The Committee voted unanimously not to recommend any change to the 
current Rule 103. 
Rule 404. Character Evidence. Federal Rule 404(a)(l) on character of the accused was 
amended to provide that when the accused attacks the character of a victim under 
subdivision (a)@) of the rule, the door is opened to an attack on the same character trait 
of the accused. 
There were four members who do criminal defense work and they were concerned that 
this allowed the defendant's character to be attacked even if the defendant did not take 
the stand and that it would make defendants feel compelled to testify, even though the 
rule was limited to the same character trait. The rationale is a "fair is fair" one; that is, if 
the defendant gets to put on evidence that the victim is a violent person then the state 
should get to put on evidence showing that the defendant is also a violent person. 
However, the harm caused by presenting this evidence as to the defendant will be greater 
than the harm caused by presenting this evidence as to the victim. 
Kipp Manwaring is the only prosecutor on the Committee and he stated he has often seen 
trials turn into mini-trials on the assassination of the character of the victim and he 
thought this allowed the jury to get the whole story. 
Judge Smith believes there is already a problem in defining "traits of character"'. 
This amendment was seen as a big change to Idaho law that needs more input from the 
defense bar and prosecutors. The vote was nine to one against recommending any 
change at this time. 
Rule 803. Hearsav Exceotions. The Committee reviewed the recent amendment to 
section (6) of the federal rule addressing records of regularly conducted activity that 
provides that the foundation requirements can be satisfied under certain circumstances 
with a certificate rather than the testimony of the custodian of the record or another 
qualified witness. The idea is to avoid the time, expense and inconvenience of producing 
a foundation witness. Without the rule this situation is often handled by a stipulation and 
agreement. The Committee thought the burden should be on the party who wanted the 
document to produce the witness unless both parties agreed otherwise and the burden 
should not be on the other side to have to subpoena or take a deposition if they wanted to 
challenge the document. 
The vote was three in favor and four against recommending a similar change to the Idaho 
rule. 
Rule 502. Lawver-Client Privilege. Craig Lewis brought this item to the Committee. 
502(b)(3) is intended to extend the privilege to communications during meetings of 
lawyers and clients who are dealing with matters of common interest, such as a joint 
strategy discussion by joint defendants and their counsel. As presently worded, the rule 
would only extend the privilege to communications to a lawyer or lawyer's 
representative, not to communications by a client to another client, or a lawyer to another 
lawyer's client, and Craig thought this was an oversight. 
After discussion, the Committee decided that the rule should be clarified so that the 
privilege would cover the following: 1) what one lawyer says to a different client on a 
matter of common interest, 2) what one client says to another in a joint session where at 
least one attorney is present, 3) what the two lawyers say to one another without the 
clients around as to the common defense or matter of common interest. 
The Committee rejected the idea of extending the privilege to a discussion between the 
two clients or co-defendants unless at least one attorney is present and the discussion is 
on a matter of common interest. It is the client that holds the privilege. 
Craig Lewis volunteered to draft a proposal for amending this rule and Judge Lansing 
also volunteered to work with Cathy Derden on a draft proposal. Proposed language will 
be circulated. 
Rule 609. Im~eachment bv Evidence of Conviction of Crime. At the last meeting in 
1999, Judge Lansing placed this rule on the agenda. The Committee reviewed this rule in 
light of recent case law and the difficulty that has arisen in determining whether the prior 
conviction is relevant to the credibility of the witness. Currently the Idaho courts 
categorize crimes to determine if they are relevant to credibility, but consistency in the 
application of the categories is difficult, and the proposal was to adopt the approach of 
the federal rule. The federal rule allows any felony to be used to impeach a witness other 
than the accused. If it is the accused, then the felony conviction can only be used if the 
probative value outweighs the prejudice unless it is a crime of dishonesty or false 
statement. 
At the 1999 meeting a subcommittee composed of Tony Anegon, Craig Lewis, Doug 
Werth, and Kipp Manwaring was appointed to look at drafting an amendment; however, 
the subcommittee could not agree on the best approach. Kipp and Doug proposed 
allowing the fact of any felony conviction to be used for impeachment but not the nature 
of the conviction unless the court determines the nature is relevant or the party offering 
the witness wants to offer it. Tony and Craig proposed limiting impeachment to only 
felonies involving dishonesty or false statement. 
Judge Smith stated that he believed all witnesses should be treated alike and was opposed 
to treating the accused differently. He was also not convinced that only crimes involving 
dishotiesty or false statement were relevant to the credibility of the witness. 
A suggestion was made that the Idaho rule be amended to eliminate allowing the nature 
of the conviction unless the witness wants to put it in or it is a crime involving dishonesty 
or false statement. 
The proposal was to amend Rule 609(a) as follows: 
"(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of 
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony shall 
be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but only if the 
court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that &&&ef the prior . . 
conviction , is relevant to the credibility 
of the w i t n l ~ h l s  evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the party bffering the witness. The nature of the conviction &all be 
admitted onlv if the conviction is one of dishonestv or false statement or if presented by 
the witness or party offering the witness 
. . k, but evidence of the circumstances of the 
conviction shall not be admissible." 
Other option discussed 
"(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of 
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony shall 
be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record, but only if the 
court determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that ikgfitc;t-ef the prior . . 
conviction , is relevant to the credibility 
of the w i t n ~ u l ~ s  evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the party offering the witness. If the felonv is a crime of dishonesty 
or false statement. evidence of the nature of the felonv shall also be admitted. If the 
evidence of the conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, is 
admitted for the purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or proceeding, the pwty 
witness or non-impeaching party shall have the option to present evidence of the nature 
of the conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall not be 
admissible." 
Both Craig Lewis and Judge Lansing will work on further drafting of amendments to 
Rule 609 and will have the subcommittee review them before circulating them to the 
Committee for approval. 
Judge Lansing reported that the subcommittee on the mediator privilege would report 
next year. 

